The Arithmetic of Emotion: Integration of Incidental and Integral Affect in Judgments and Decisions by Daniel Västfjäll et al.
fpsyg-07-00325 March 8, 2016 Time: 15:32 # 1
REVIEW
published: 08 March 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00325
Edited by:
Bernd Weber,
Rheinische
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität,
Germany
Reviewed by:
Britt Anderson,
University of Waterloo, Canada
Giorgio Coricelli,
University of Southern California, USA
*Correspondence:
Daniel Västfjäll
daniel.vastfjall@liu.se
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Decision Neuroscience,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 06 January 2016
Accepted: 21 February 2016
Published: 08 March 2016
Citation:
Västfjäll D, Slovic P, Burns WJ,
Erlandsson A, Koppel L, Asutay E
and Tinghög G (2016) The Arithmetic
of Emotion: Integration of Incidental
and Integral Affect in Judgments
and Decisions. Front. Psychol. 7:325.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00325
The Arithmetic of Emotion:
Integration of Incidental and Integral
Affect in Judgments and Decisions
Daniel Västfjäll1,2*, Paul Slovic2, William J. Burns2, Arvid Erlandsson1, Lina Koppel1,
Erkin Asutay1 and Gustav Tinghög1
1 Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden, 2 Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA
Research has demonstrated that two types of affect have an influence on judgment and
decision making: incidental affect (affect unrelated to a judgment or decision such as a
mood) and integral affect (affect that is part of the perceiver’s internal representation of
the option or target under consideration). So far, these two lines of research have seldom
crossed so that knowledge concerning their combined effects is largely missing. To fill
this gap, the present review highlights differences and similarities between integral and
incidental affect. Further, common and unique mechanisms that enable these two types
of affect to influence judgment and choices are identified. Finally, some basic principles
for affect integration when the two sources co-occur are outlined. These mechanisms
are discussed in relation to existing work that has focused on incidental or integral affect
but not both.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine walking through a park on a warm, sunny day eating your favorite ice cream. As you sit
down to relax, a person from a charitable organization approaches you and asks for donations to
a child in need. You are shown a photograph of 7-year-old Rokia, who is facing starvation. What
information determines your decision to help Rokia? Your response is likely based in part on your
current affective reaction (Schwarz, 2012). Some of the affect experienced in this situation comes
from the images elicited by Rokia. Research shows that the experienced affect associated with the
child in need influences judgment and decision making (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002;
Västfjäll and Slovic, 2013).
Affect stemming from a target, such as Rokia, is called integral affect or endogenous affect.
Loewenstein and Lerner (2002) defined integral affect as affective influences that result from
consideration of the decision or judgmental target itself. However, in many judgments other
sources of affect are also present. In our donation example, unrelated or irrelevant affect (i.e., mood)
elicited by the environment or the weather may also influence judgments of how we perceive the
world (Schwarz, 2001). Even though the affective state is unrelated to the judgmental target, it
influences judgments and decisions (Schwarz and Clore, 2004). In a famous example, Johnson and
Tversky (1983) found that incidental affect (i.e., a mood state) induced by reading a newspaper
article influenced subsequent risk judgments. Such influences stem from incidental or exogenous
affect. Incidental affect encompasses all factors that elicit affect, but are unrelated to the judgmental
target (e.g., mood, priming, motor affect, affective conditioning; Loewenstein and Lerner, 2002).
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In our example, integral affect and incidental affect are
both likely to influence the final judgment. However, integral
affect is a “genuine” subjective reaction to a target, whereas
incidental affect may be misattributed as a genuine reaction to
the target or it may differentially highlight congruent affective
representations of the object (Schwarz and Clore, 1983). Integral
and incidental affect are often simultaneously present and jointly
determine the total affective reaction to a target. We agree
with Neumann et al. (2001, p. 727). claim that “. . .whenever
a new affective stimulus is encountered, the resulting affective
feeling is a function of the valence and intensity of the feeling
present at the time of the encounter and the valence and
intensity of the affective feeling elicited by the new stimulus”.
Similarly, Bechara (2011, p. 88) writes “The effectiveness of
the emotion integral to the decision-making process depends
on the strength of the unrelated emotion that exists in the
background”.
Thus, the donation decision may be influenced by two
distinct types of affect, – one that is integral to the decision
(affect elicited by considering the child and her situation) and
one that is incidental to the choice (mood elicited by the
sunny day). This distinction is important to consider because
incidental and integral affect may have different determinants
and effects on judgment. Further, confusion exists as to what
the term affect means, especially in the context of influences
on judgments. An illustrative example is provided by Haidt
(2002) who discussed the relation between the “Affect Infusion
Model” (AIM; a model of incidental affect; Forgas, 1995) and
the social intuitionist model (a model of integral moral affective
responses). Haidt (2002, p. 56) wrote that “. . .there appear to
be large differences in how the AIM and the social intuitionist
model explain the role of affect in moral judgment. These
differences vanish, however, once it becomes clear that the
two models are using the term affect in very different ways.
If the AIM were renamed the mood infusion model, there
would be no apparent contradiction”. Thus, pitting incidental
against integral affect will ultimately help to clarify the affect
concept.
The claim that both integral affect and incidental affect
concurrently guide judgments and decisions has so far received
little attention. Research on integral and incidental affect has
been separate, with integral-affect research seldom considering
participants’ incidental mood states (for exceptions see Peters and
Slovic, 2000; Västfjäll et al., 2004) and incidental research seldom
considering the integral affect that stems from the judgmental
target (but see Bodenhausen et al., 2001). However, as our
donation example suggests, integral and incidental affect likely
co-occur on a regular basis. We suggest that incidental-integral
affect interactions are common since people are always in some
affective state (even a neutral mood is a piece of information;
Russell, 2003). Similarly most options under consideration
evoke some affect, although to different degrees (Dhar and
Wertenbroch, 2000).
The goal of this paper is thus to review research on integral
and incidental affect and to identify some of their common and
contrasting features. From this analysis, a new set of predictions
can be made that will highlight research needs and controversies
in the existing literature. This analysis will also serve as a step
towards a more integrative theory of the influence of different
sources of affect in judgment and decision making.
Terminology
The generic term affect is defined here as: a specific quality
of “goodness” or “badness” experienced as a feeling state (with
or without consciousness). This goodness–badness dimesion is
often labeled “valence” (Russell, 2003). Valenced affect varies in
intensity from low to high. In addition to valence, affect can be
described by the arousal component of core affect (Russell, 2003)
as well as the appraisals or conceptual knowledge leading up to
an affective response (Barrett, 2015). This review focuses on the
valence of integral and incidental affect. For a detailed discussion
on the effects of arousal on judgment (see Storbeck and Clore,
2008 and for the effects of appraisal on decision making see
Lerner et al., 2015).
Affective responses can occur rapidly and automatically, and
may be elicited by stimulus properties, physical stimulation,
perception of one’s immediate environment, thoughts and
memories, or proprioceptive cues (Wyer et al., 1999).
Affect informs us about our relation with the surrounding
environment. From an evolutionary perspective, affect can
be seen as the human alarm system. Positive affect signals
that everything is safe and no specific action is needed for
survival, whereas negative affect signals a potential threat
and need for action. Affect thus has strong consequences for
behavior and information processing. Affect has, at least, four
separate roles for guiding judgment and behavior (Peters et al.,
2006). First, as described above, affect can act as information.
Second, it can act as a spotlight focusing us on different
information. Third, affect can motivate us to take action
or do extra work. Finally, affect may serve as a common
currency allowing us to compare apples and oranges (Cabanac,
1992).
Mood, one form of affect, is a relatively stable and mild
affective state that does not have a specific object (Frijda, 1993),
whereas emotions, another form of affect, are more intense
and have specific objects. In the words of Clore et al. (1994b,
p. 326), “mood refers to [a] feeling state, which need not be
about anything, whereas emotion refers to how one feels in
combination with what that feeling is about”.
Incidental affect then is an affective state, such as a mood state,
brought about by environmental or intrinsic stimulation. Integral
affect, on the other hand, is elicited by perceiving the target or a
mental representation of the target.
INTEGRAL AFFECT
Integral affect is a pervasive aspect of daily life. We have affective
feelings of different valences and intensities to most objects
we encounter everyday. Integral affect is what enables us to
differentiate good options from bad. Without integral affect,
people would not have their favorite cookies, sports shows, or
movie stars. Integral affect thus helps categorize our experiences
along a good–bad dimension (Kahneman et al., 1997).
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How are integral affect responses formed? Damasio (1994)
argued that images become “marked” by positive and negative
feelings linked directly or indirectly to somatic or bodily
states. When a negative somatic marker is linked to an
image of a future outcome, it sounds an alarm. When a
positive marker is associated with the outcome image, it
becomes a beacon of incentive. Damasio (1994) hypothesized
that somatic markers increase the accuracy and efficiency
of the decision process and their absence, observed in
people with certain types of brain damage, degrades decision
performance.
In work on the affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic
et al., 2002), we have argued that people consult or refer to
an “affect pool” containing all the positive and negative tags
consciously or unconsciously associated with the representation
of the decision problem. Individuals consult this “affect pool”
when making a judgment, rather than reviewing all available
information. Slovic et al. (2002) noted that reliance on the affect
heuristic is greater when deliberative capacity is limited and is
less pronounced when deliberation increases. Risk judgments
are often made based on this integral response (Risk-as-
feelings; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic and Västfjäll, 2010).
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001), for example, demonstrated that
decision makers react strongly to a low probability of a strongly
affective event (they value it highly) but they are insensitive
to increases in that probability (its evaluation is not much
higher despite its greater likelihood). The evaluation of a weakly
affective event, on the other hand, grows more linearly with its
probability.
Integral affective feelings are also readily accessible when
making decisions. For example, Verplanken et al. (1998)
demonstrated that participants responded more rapidly
to their feelings than their thoughts (i.e., cognitions)
about attitude objects. This accessibility is important
because whatever is accessed earlier may influence later
processing or directly impact behaviors (Peters et al.,
2009). Ortony et al. (1988, p. 156) characterize the integral
affective response (they call it “object-based emotion”) as
“more immediate, more spontaneous, and less affected by
accessible cognitive processes than almost all of the other
emotions.”
Pham et al. (2001) suggested that integral affective responses
can be elicited by three types of mechanisms: Type-I affect
is based on the triggering of very basic, innate, sensory-
motor programs that are important for bio-regulation (i.e.,
avoidance of bitter-tasting food). Type-II affect is triggered by the
mapping of stimulus features onto acquired schematic structures
that have been previously associated, through conditioning or
episodic memory, with particular affective responses, similar
to Damasio’s (1994) somatic markers. Type-III affect is based
on a controlled appraisal of the stimulus that involves a
subjective assessment of the stimulus’ significance for well-
being.
Bodenhausen et al. (2001) further distinguished between
chronic integral affect, referring to enduring affective reactions to
a specific target, and episodic integral affect that contains affective
reactions activated in a particular setting.
INCIDENTAL AFFECT
Incidental Moods
Incidental mood states may also be used as a heuristic for
making evaluative judgments (Schwarz, 2012). The mood-as-
information view assumes that, when people make evaluative
judgments, they do not consult all available information but
simplify judgments by using their affective reaction to the object
as a basis. People ask themselves “How do I feel about it?” and,
while doing this, monitor their own feelings. Current mood may
be misattributed as a reaction to the target. As a result, evaluative
mood-congruent judgments occur (Schwarz and Clore, 2007)1.
For example, minor mood-influencing events such as finding a
coin in a copying machine or learning that a favorite soccer team
won a game influenced ratings of global subjective well-being
(Schwarz, 2012).
Salience of Mood
Mood is a relatively salient affective state. Research on cue
salience has shown that salient cues are the primary determinant
of judgments (Kahneman, 2003). Schwarz (2001) therefore
suggested that the more the salient mood is compared to other
information relevant for the judgment, the greater the effect it
will have on the judgment. Other cues may even be disregarded
in the presence of a salient mood. Siemer and Reisenzein (1998)
noted that mood salience is often related to increases in mood
intensity.
Misattribution and Judgmental Correction: the
Affective Gatekeeper
A central premise for affect misattribution to occur is that
the affective system cannot distinguish “true” (integral) feelings
from “false” (incidental) feelings, and thus treats any currently
experienced affect as a reaction to the target currently attended.
While much research has shown that misattribution occurs
frequently in everyday life (e.g., Schwarz, 2012) there are certain
conditions where misattribution may not occur – where the
“affective gatekeeper” is alerted that affective information should
be discounted and not treated as a genuine reaction to the target.
For instance, people only use their current feelings as a basis of
judgment when it is perceived to contain valuable or diagnostic
information (Pham, 2007) or when there is no cause to distrust
the feeling as being a genuine reaction to the target (Schwarz,
2012). In a classical demonstration of how subtle reminders
can alert the affective gatekeeper, Schwarz and Clore (1983)
showed that when participants were made aware that their mood
was caused by something unrelated to the judgmental target
(e.g., a rainy day or misattribution manipulation), the mood-
congruent effect disappeared or was discounted (Schwarz, 2012).
Thus, certain cues can alert the affective gatekeeper and help to
determine what information is integrated, and what information
is excluded, from overall affective judgments.
Other research also suggests that this type of affective
gatekeeping is the second stage in a two-stage process where
1We leave aside discussion of how incidental affect influence cognitive processes
(Isen, 2000) or how it motivates behavior as it is not a primary focus of the present
article.
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available information (i.e., affect) is used as a first proxy for
evaluation, then a correction or “reality check” is applied if, for
some reason, the correctness of the initial evaluation is called
into question (Gilbert, 2002). The effect of mood may not only
be eliminated by this, but even reversed. For instance, Wegener
et al. (1995) demonstrated that people tend to overcorrect when
they believe that how they feel will influence their judgments.
This overcorrection can lead to mood-incongruent judgments.
Similarly, Pham (1998) showed that, when participants believed
their feelings were of no importance for the decision, mood
effects diminished. Thus, mood needs to be representative or
relevant for the judgment task to enter into the judgmental
process.
Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) further noted, however, that
mood salience may be related to mood source awareness, in that
if intensity is high (as in the case of emotions) people also often
become aware of what is causing the effect. When participants
become aware of the mood-producing source, incidental mood is
likely to have a smaller or no effect on the subsequent judgment
as the mood is viewed as irrelevant and is discounted or corrected
(Schwarz, 2001).
Source Salience Limits the Effects of Incidental Affect
on Judgments But Not the Experience
Being aware of the source of the mood may limit its influence on
judgments, but does not appear to alter physiological indices of
experienced affect (as measured by facial EMG) (Neumann et al.,
2001). Studies of individual differences in the use of incidental
affect also suggests that making the true source of the incidental
affect salient does not always lead to discounting or correction.
Gasper and Clore (2000), for example, demonstrated that both
chronically anxious individuals and those low in attention-paid-
to-feelings relied on current mood even when the true source
of their affect was made salient. For those low in attention-
paid-to-feelings, the misattribution manipulation served to make
the mood salient and of use in judgments. This finding is in
agreement with Siemer and Reisenzein’s (1998, p. 800) threshold
hypothesis in which they assume that “mood has an effect
on evaluative judgments only if it exceeds a certain minimum
value, or threshold, of salience”. However, this conclusion is
contested by a large literature showing that subliminally induced
affect (“unconscious emotion”) has strong effects on evaluative
judgments (Zajonc, 1980; Winkielman and Berridge, 2004).
Incidental Motor Influences and Somatic
Processes
Incidental affect includes, not only incidental moods, but also
affect elicited by facial, postural, and behavior expression that
may be misattributed as relevant reactions to targets (Schwarz
and Clore, 2004). According to Neumann and Strack (2000),
these motor and somatic processes can be divided into two
groups on the basis of their experiential quality (i.e., the extent
to which they elicit affect that is experienced).
Incidental Motor Influences
Neumann and Strack (2000) suggested that some motor tasks
influence the experience of affect and that this experiential
affect then mediates any effects on subsequent judgments (see
also Strack, 1992). Their primary example is facially induced
affect. Facially induced affect can be manipulated by having
participants contract the zygomatic muscle in the cheek (Strack
et al., 1988). Facilitating smiling (by having participants hold
a pen between the teeth) increased the rated funniness of a
cartoon, whereas inhibiting smiling (by having participants hold
a pen between their lips) decreased the rated funniness of the
same cartoon. Zajonc et al. (1989) showed that pronouncing
vowels that facilitated smiling (the vowel e) versus vowels that
inhibited smiling (the German vowel ü) produced similar results.
Motor influences are not always mediated by experienced affect,
however, (Neumann and Strack, 2000). For instance, isometric
flexion and extension of the arm, head movements, pushing a
lever toward or away from the body, and the visual impression
of moving away or toward the computer screen are all tasks that
influence evaluation of targets without any evidence of changes
in experienced affect (Winkielman and Berridge, 2004).
Incidental Emotions
Incidental emotions invoked by a specific eliciting event are
associated with specific appraisal patterns (Lerner et al., 2015).
Lerner and Keltner (2000) demonstrated that judgments of
risk were differentially influenced by incidental fear and anger.
Further, Lerner et al. (2004) demonstrated that sadness and
disgust differentially influenced the endowment effect. Sad
individuals showed a stronger effect of ownership compared
to those in a neutral mood, whereas disgusted individuals
demonstrated a reverse endowment effect. This research
suggests that cognitive appraisals of incidental emotions
may dominate behavioral responses over their experiential
quality.
DeSteno et al. (2000) also demonstrated that sadness and
anger, two distinct negative emotions, differentially biased
likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. In addition,
a reversal of the bias occurred for individuals who expended
greater cognitive effort and thus may have been more aware of
the source of the emotion. Similarly, Keltner et al. (1993) showed
that asking participants to label their current affect as specific
emotions forced them to think about the cause of the feeling, and
rendered the affect uninformative for subsequent judgments of
well-being.
Consequently, incidental emotions are less likely to influence
judgments than incidental mood, since emotions are strong in
intensity and people are highly aware of their cause. Based
on research demonstrating that reminders of the cause of
experienced affect reduce mood’s influence on judgments, intense
incidental emotions should not influence normatively unrelated
target judgments (Schwarz, 2001). However, appraisal tendencies
could still have a separate effect on judgments and behaviors. In
fact, the appraisal effect of incidental emotions may be resilient
to misattribution manipulations (Han et al., 2010). The intensity
and perceived salience of incidental emotions dissipates over
time, however, leaving the individual in a diffuse mood state.
After a sufficient decay of emotion intensity and a decreased focus
on the cause of the affect, incidental emotions then may color
unrelated judgments. Such diffuse mood states, however, may be
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based more on valenced affect, rather than a discrete emotion
(Peters et al., 2004).
Experiential Salience and Affect
Awareness
Awareness of the affect-eliciting source may be characterized
along a continuum from no awareness (e.g., approach/avoidance
tasks; facially induced affect) to medium awareness (moods;
often the source is not apparent, but experimental manipulations
may be used to direct attention to the source) to high
awareness (emotions; source is often evident.) This distinction
is similar to Wyer et al.’s (1999) proposal that affect elicited
by low intensity cues (e.g., proprioceptive cues) does not
receive conscious attention. Other affective states, instantiated
by events or appraisals, are of higher intensity and therefore
noticed. Experiential salience concerns the accessibility of affect
upon introspection. The experiential salience of the affect
is different from awareness of the source although the two
concepts sometimes are related (Siemer and Reisenzein, 1998).
For instance, incidental emotions are highly salient in people’s
minds, and people are quite aware of the affect-inducing source.
For moods, however, experiential salience may be high while
awareness of the source remains low. For experiential motor
influences such as facial feedback, affect is salient (as evidenced
by changes in self-reported mood; Strack et al., 1988), but source
awareness is very low. Non-experiential affective tasks such as the
arm flexion manipulation are low in both experiential salience
and source awareness. Affect that is experientially more salient
will influence judgments more. We suggest that experiential
salience and source awareness are two main experiential factors
that influence the use of incidental affect as information.
THE INTEGRATION OF INTEGRAL AND
INCIDENTAL AFFECT
Affect Integration: Averaging and
Summation
How do incidental and integral affect combine into a single
affective reaction? Ample research in impression formation
shows that adding information that is moderately positive to
information that is highly positive leads to lower judgments
(Anderson, 1981), resulting from averaging values rather than
adding them (see also Seta et al., 2008). An example of this
from the consumer domain is provided by Yadav (1994), who
asked consumers to rate their preference for different sets of
furniture. Participants in the individual-item condition read
information about a bed that pretest participants had rated as
excellent. Those in the bundle condition rated a set consisting
of two items: the same highly favorable bed plus a chest that
was described as moderately favorable. Participants gave higher
preference ratings to the bed alone than those in a separate
group gave to a set containing both the bed and the moderately
favorable chest (see also Weaver et al., 2012). Interestingly,
Kralik et al. (2012) found evidence for similar averaging in non-
human primates; rhesus monkeys preferred a high-value food
item alone to the same item paired with one of positive but
lower value. Similarly, Hsee et al. (1999) asked respondents to
state the amount they were willing to pay to purchase each of
two sets of dinnerware. Set S contained 24 pieces, all in good
condition. Set J contained all of the same pieces plus 8 more,
all in good condition, along with 16 other pieces that were
broken (40 total). In single (separate) evaluation, respondents
were willing to pay more for set S, though it was the inferior
option, apparently devalued by the broken pieces. But in joint
(side-by-side) evaluation, respondents were willing to pay more
for Set J. Thus, in separate evaluation, negative affect appears to
reduce positive affect through averaging.
But sometimes the integration goes awry in a peculiar form of
affective calculus that Polish poet Herbert (2007, p. 286) has called
“the arithmetic of compassion”. For example when only one life
is at stake, the value attached to saving or prolonging that life is
extreme. But as the number of lives at risk increases, phenomena
such as psychophysical numbing and psychic numbing (Slovic,
2007), appear to lead our fast, intuitive, gut reactions on a
path much different from one guided by the normal logic of
arithmetic. With numbing, one life plus one life may be valued at
something less than two lives. With compassion fade or collapse,
1+ 1 may be valued as less than 1 (Västfjäll et al., 2014).
In additional experiments we have studied the arithmetic of
compassion in the context of what we term “pseudoinefficacy”
(Västfjäll et al., 2015; see also Slovic and Slovic, 2015; Wiss et al.,
2015). We have documented that positive feelings about children
one can help are dampened by negative feelings associated
with children who cannot be helped. Specifically, we found that
pictures of the children not helped induced negative affect that
reduced the positive warm glow for the child that could be helped.
The stronger the negative feelings associated with those not
helped, the lower the warm glow anticipated from helping a child
who could be helped. We further found that the pseudoinefficacy
effect is not merely due to visual distraction resulting from images
of children not helped. Warm-glow ratings of a single child
who could be helped were not reduced when that child was
accompanied by non-affective visual distractors (e.g., a shape).
In further support of an affect-based explanation, we found that
when other, unrelated, pictures that induced negative emotion
(taken from the International Affective Picture System; Bradley
and Lang, 2000) accompanied the single child, warm-glow ratings
were as low as in the pseudoinefficacy conditions where children
not being helped were present. The stronger the rated negative
affect toward the unrelated pictures, the lower the warm glow that
was associated with helping.
Taken together, ample research suggests that different sources
of affect are averaged or summed (Anderson, 1981). However,
other research has found that not all forms of affect integration
follow simple arithmetic laws such as averaging (Olsen and
Pracejus, 2004; Chowdhury et al., 2008). To guide our discussion
of how incidental and integral affect may be combined in ways
that differ from averaging, we first discuss relevant research on
the effects of incidental affect on judgments of integral affect.
Such judgments appear to be based on the integration of affective
reactions to a target (integral affect) with more free-floating
incidental affect.
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Mood Effects on Judgments
In this section we examine studies that investigated the influence
of incidental mood on affective judgments (i.e., well-being, liking
judgments, emotion ratings) of a specific target other than the
person’s mood state.
Congruence and Incongruence
Schwarz and Clore (1983) showed in an early study that current
mood influenced ratings of overall well-being in a mood-
congruent manner (assimilation). A later study by Siemer and
Reisenzein (1998) replicated these findings using a large number
of satisfaction and emotion items. Neumann et al. (2001) found
that a pre-existing mood state intensified congruent emotional
responses to a humorous cartoon and attenuated incongruent
emotional reactions. Other research, however, suggests that
current mood is sometimes contrasted with the affective
valence of the judgmental target, resulting in mood-incongruent
judgments (Martin, 2000). For example, Manstead et al. (1983)
found that humorous movie clips were evaluated more positively
if they followed a negative-affect-inducing movie than if they
followed a positive-affect-inducing movie. Schwarz et al. (1987)
induced pleasant or unpleasant moods by letting participants stay
in a pleasant or unpleasant room. Following the mood induction,
participants rated their global well-being and their satisfaction
with their housing conditions (e.g., in their dormitory). A mood-
congruent effect was obtained on global well-being, a mood-
incongruent effect (contrast) on ratings of housing satisfaction.
Participants thus used their mood as information for an overall
affect judgment, but used their pleasant or unpleasant experience
in the experiment as a standard of comparison or reference
point to construct the specific judgment about housing. Thus,
mood-incongruent effects can be obtained when a salient and
meaningful standard of reference is readily available. Figure 1 is
a schematic representation of how congruency and incongruency
effects may influence overall affect.
In Figure 1, we assume that both incidental and integral
affects contribute to the overall affective reaction. The relative
weight placed on incidental and integral affect, respectively,
is unknown and likely to vary with situational demands and
individual characteristics. Their accessibility and knowledge of
their source should also influence their weights. We do, however,
assign integral affect a relatively larger role in determining the
total affective reaction since an integral affective reaction, by
definition, is a relevant source of affect.
Mood-congruent effects are obtained when the valence of the
incidental affect influences the target so that positive incidental
affect makes the evaluation of the target more positive, and
negative incidental affect influences evaluations so that the target
is perceived as more negative. The processes underlying this
effect may include a highlighting of valence-congruent attributes
so that they draw more attention, are more accessible while
considering the target, and thus receive more weight in the
judgment (Kahneman, 2003).
Mood-incongruent effects are obtained when positive
incidental affect makes the judgmental target be perceived
as more negative, than a negative incidental affect state does
FIGURE 1 | Three different forms of affect integration previously proposed in the literature. (1) Mood-congruent effects are obtained when the valence of
the incidental affect influences the target so that positive incidental affect makes the evaluation of the target more positive, and negative incidental affect influences
evaluations so that the target is perceived as more negative (upper). (2) Mood-incongruent effects are obtained when positive incidental affect makes the judgmental
target be perceived as more negative, than a negative incidental affect state does (middle). (3) Affect additivity is the case where congruent valences of incidental
and integral affect are added and incongruent valences cancel each other (bottom).
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(depicted in the middle part of Figure 1). Mood-incongruent
judgments typically occur through motivated affect regulation,
when people overcorrect for a mood-inducing bias (Schwarz,
2001) or when a salient comparison is available. Possible
processes underlying this effect include increased deliberative
processing due to processing focus or motivated processing to
maintain or attain a positive mood or perceived well being.
Additivity-of-Affect
Research obtaining mood-congruent or mood-incongruent
effects typically has studied the effect of incidental mood, a
relatively salient experiential state. Other research suggests that
incidental affect that is less experientially salient may influence
integral affective reactions to targets differently (Murphy et al.,
1995). For instance, Neumann et al. (2001, p. 726) argued that
“pre-existing moods fuse with feeling stemming from an emotion
eliciting event”. Neumann et al. (2001) suggest that congruent
valences should add together (see bottom row of Figure 1),
whereas incongruent valences should cancel (“additivity-of-affect
hypothesis”; note that for incongruent valences, the mood-
congruence view would suggest that incidental affect would
either dampen or intensify the integral affect, but not cancel).
Moreover, Neumann et al. (2001) argue that only affect that is
experientially salient and low in source awareness (e.g., facially
induced affect, unobtrusively induced moods) should exhibit
this additivity of affect. Neumann et al. (2001) investigated the
influence of incidental affect (induced by having participants
listen to a philosophical talk spoken either with a happy or sad
voice) on integral affect (humor responses) and found that it
followed the additivity-of-affect pattern: The incidental mood
induction resulted in the expected mood ratings (happy and
sad), but participants were not aware that the tone of voice
had influenced feelings. This finding suggests that indeed the
incidental affect manipulation was experientially salient and low
in source awareness.
In summary, incidental affect may either influence
judgments of integral affect through mechanisms of mood
congruence/assimilation and mood in-congruence/contrast or
according to the affect-additivity principle. We propose that
a major determinant for the type of affect integration is the
experiential salience and awareness of the source of incidental
affect. For incidental affect that is low in source awareness
[unobtrusively induced moods as in Neumann et al.’s (2001)
study or facially induced affect], affect integration should follow
the affect-additivity principle, whereas incidental affect higher
in source awareness should follow the principles of mood
congruence/incongruence.
An Example of Affect Integration: Integral Affect’s
Role in Determining the Intensity of the Overall
Response
It is possible to characterize both incidental and integral affect
in terms of their experiential salience and source awareness.
Whereas incidental affect can vary in both salience and
awareness, we assume that integral affect is generally high in
source awareness (because the judgment is about the source), but
that it can vary in intensity and precision.
Affect intensity is the strength of the integral response
to a stimulus (Frijda, 1993). Higher affect intensity will be
experientially more salient. In addition, some events, objects,
or thoughts elicit precise responses, in that they exhibit little
variation across situations and/or individuals, whereas other
responses seem to be more imprecise with larger variation.
Precise integral responses are often based on vivid mental or
actual images and are easily mapped onto a good–bad scale
(Slovic et al., 2002). Imprecise integral responses are experienced
when affect is ambiguous, due to the existence of conflicting or
mixed affect (Larsen et al., 2001) or a lack of vivid images or
comparison from which to draw meaning. Both the intensity and
precision of the integral response are likely to determine the role
of incidental affect in the overall judgment. More specifically,
we argue that incidental affect will have a larger influence on
judgments when the integral response is less intense and/or less
precise. When integral affect is strong, incidental affect has little
possibility to influence the overall affective reaction. However,
when integral affect is weak, incidental affect will be allowed a
larger influence. If the affect (as an experienced affective reaction
per se) is absent, current incidental affect will have a stronger
influence (Figure 2).
We found initial support for this hypothesis in a study
of charitable giving (Västfjäll et al., 2008). Participants were
first induced to negative or positive moods (incidental affect)
and were then asked to donate money either to a target with
precise/intense integral affect (a single, named individual shown
in a photograph) or to a target eliciting less precise/intense
integral affect (a single, unidentified statistical victim). Consistent
with the hypothesis outlined above, positive-mood participants
gave more than negative-mood participants only when the target
elicited less precise/intense integral affect.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Two types of affect, integral and incidental, both have substantial
influence on judgment and decision making. However, until now
FIGURE 2 | The influence of incidental affect is contingent on the
intensity of integral affect. Left bars for strong integral affect, incidental
affect has little possibility to influence the overall affective reaction. Middle bars
for weak integral affect, incidental affect is allowed a relatively large influence.
Right bars if integral affect is absent, incidental affect will have a stronger
contribution to the overall affective reaction.
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few attempts have been made to compare incidental and integral
affect, but several calls for such integrative work have been issued.
For instance, Perrott and Bodenhausen (2002) asked to what
extent models of incidental affect can accommodate integral
affect? Perrott and Bodenhausen (2002, p. 85–85) further argued
that “It remains very much an open question whether these types
of [integral] affect operate on the same general principles as those
that have been documented in studies investigating incidental
affect”. Ultimately, a full response to this question requires more
empirical data. Based on existing research, the present review
delineated a select number of mechanisms concerning how and
when incidental and integral affect jointly influence judgments
and decisions. It is our hope that this review will stimulate further
empirical studies.
So far, research focusing only on incidental affect has tended
either to assume that the target under consideration elicits no
affect (or is affectively neutral) or it has been vague in specifying
the role of integral affect. Forgas (2002) even argued that some
incidental affect research explicitly predicts that integral affect
should not influence judgments. It is, however, evident that
integral affect is present in many studies focusing on incidental
affect. The question becomes: to what extent does integral affect
modify the misattribution of incidental affect? The present review
suggests that both incidental and integral affect theories need
to take into account both forms of affect. First, if integral and
incidental are simultaneously present, we assume that integral
affect will dominate the overall response. Second, our analysis
suggests that it is mainly when integral affect is moderate or low
in intensity that current incidental mood will have a substantial
effect on the overall judgment. Third, our review suggests that
incidental affect will have a substantial effect on the integral
response when incidental affect is salient (but the source is not
salient).
Similarly, the current review suggests that research focusing
on integral affect must consider incidental affect. Several reasons
for this can be highlighted. First, people are always in a more
or less valenced mood state (Russell, 2003) so that incidental
affect has the potential to influence most judgments. Second, it
is likely that many integral responses are of moderate intensity.
The functional value of integral responses would otherwise
be very limited. Research on emotion intensity suggests that
people seldom experience very strong affect (both incidental
and integral emotions), presumably because prolonged, high-
intensity experiences would ultimately exhaust the human
biological system (Clore et al., 1994a). Incidental affect is likely
to have its largest impact on moderate and low intensity integral
responses. Third, both incidental and integral affect are both
most likely to influence judgments when other judgment criteria
and/or information are unavailable, and when deliberative
processing is impaired (Pham, 2009). It may be argued that
in such conditions, integral affect research may very well be
measuring the effect of incidental affect on judgment and
choice.
Given that both incidental and integral affect often are present
and influence the decisions people make, what is the effect in
everyday life? Our analysis suggests that integral affect often is
a good proxy for preferences, and may even be a prerequisite for
deriving meaning from abstract and complex decisions (Peters
et al., 2009). Incidental affect, however, is of another status.
Normatively, incidental affect is unrelated to the decision at hand
and may therefore be considered a bias or unwanted influence
(Vohs et al., 2007). But, our review suggests that incidental
affect may be both beneficial and detrimental to efficient decision
making (see also Pham, 2007). If incidental affect is congruent
with the target, it may amplify integral affect or the overall
affective reaction. If it is incongruent, it may attenuate the
response. In cases where affect is considered a relevant criterion,
the interaction between congruent incidental and integral affect
is likely to be beneficial. When affect is less relevant or used as
a heuristic due to restricted processing, incidental affect may be
less beneficial. The impact of integral and incidental affect on
the quality of the judgment and decisions will ultimately depend
on the specific decision context. In situations where incidental
affect may have a detrimental effect, the affective gatekeeper
must be extra alert. An important task for future research is to
more precisely identify the underlying mechanism for incidental-
integral affect integration, so that debiasing procedures can be
developed to mitigate possible detrimental effects.
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